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ANTITRUST
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Association, 884 F.2d 524
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Amateur Basketball Association ("ABA"), denied plaintiff, Behagen, a travel permit to play amateur basketball outside the
United States because he had previously been reinstated to amateur status and the ABA followed a "no-second-reinstatement" rule. A jury
awarded Behagen treble damages under federal antitrust laws, as well as
damages for violation of due process. The ABA appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the antitrust issue should
not have been heard by the jury because the Amateur Sports Act makes
clear that Congress intended the ABA, as the national governing body
of amateur basketball, to exercise monolithic control. This includes controlling amateur eligibility for Americans participating in basketball.
Therefore, the defendant's actions were exempt from coverage by federal antitrust law. The court further held that the actions by the ABA did
not constitute state action; thus, Behagen's fifth amendment due process
claim should not have gone to the jury.
Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipeline Corp., 873 F.2d 1357
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Cayman Exploration ("Cayman"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its claim under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(B)(6), against
United Gas Pipeline Corporation ("United"), for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). The district court held that Cayman failed to allege facts
sufficient that, if proved, would entitle Cayman to relief.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court held
that Cayman failed to establish that United practiced unreasonable restraint on trade. Cayman also did not establish that United was guilty of
vertical or horizontal price-fixing. The court reasoned that Cayman
failed to allege facts showing that the parties agreed to set a price at
which the other would resell to third parties. The court also held that
there were insufficient facts to show a conspiracy to establish horizontal
price-fixing. Cayman did not identify the alleged conspirators. Cayman
also did not establish that any companies had acted in a way contrary to
the best interests of their business. In addition, the court found that
Cayman's RICO claim failed. The court stated that a RICO claim must
allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Cayman failed to allege racketeering activity with sufficient
particularity.
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Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG"), was awarded
damages against defendant, Natural Gas Pipeline Company ("Natural"),
for breach of contract, attempt to monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act, and tortious interference with CIG's contractual relations. Natural appealed the district court's refusal to grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") had modified the contract terms between CIG and Natural, and these modified
terms were in fact honored by Natural. The Tenth Circuit reversed the
breach of contract verdict, reasoning that FERC's modification of the
contract preempted any breach of contract claim. The court affirmed the
tortious interference with contract verdict, finding that the FERC modification of the contract did not preclude CIG's right to bring a tort action. The evidence showed that provisions in the modified contract
rendered CIG vulnerable to manipulations by Natural which drew away
business from CIG to a competitor business owned by Natural, and
while Natural's conduct itself was technically lawful, motive is a determinative factor in converting otherwise lawful behavior into conduct for
which defendant will be liable. The court reversed the antitrust verdict
because CIG failed to prove all elements necessary for a successful claim
under the statute-specifically, that Natural's predatory scheme had the
capacity to result in a high enough market share for CIG's competitor to
be classified as a monopoly.
Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, 868 F.2d 1190
Author: Judge Barrett
In Fox I, plaintiffs, automobile dealers, were awarded damages for
violation of federal antitrust laws and the Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act ("Dealer's Act"). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
judgment against the defendants, automobile distributors, under antitrust laws, but affirmed the liability of defendant Gulf under the Dealer's
Act. Accordingly, the court remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages. On remand, the district court, in accordance with the Tenth
Circuit's directive, limited the plaintiffs' proof of damages to those
losses attributable to Gulf's discriminatory allocation of vehicles. In Fox
11, plaintiffs appealed the decision to limit damages.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly excluded the
expert witness' testimony and damage model, which attempted to quantify the plaintiffs' lost profits and loss of dealership market value from
the date of discriminatory allocation, rather than to include only those
losses attributable to Gulf's discriminatory allocation of vehicles. The
court concluded that the district court properly followed the law of the
case doctrine in deciding that the expert's testimony and damage model
did not comply with the Tenth Circuit's holding and remand in Fox I.
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In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286
Author: Judge Brorby
The states of Kansas and Missouri ("States"), asserted parens patriae
claims on behalf of their residents who purchased gas from public utilities at inflated prices. The district court dimissed the claims based on
the rule that only public utilities or direct purchasers may sue for an
illegal cover charge. Consequently, residential consumers, the indirect
purchasers of natural gas, could not maintain an antitrust suit. The
States appealed, alleging that both the cost-plus and control exceptions
to this rule would allow them to bring suit on behalf of residential
consumers.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that neither exception to the general rule
governing antitrust suits would allow the States to sue on behalf of their
residents. Under the cost-plus exception, the court held that the direct
purchasers of natural gas, the public utilities, did not have fixed fee contracts with consumers for fixed quantities of natural gas, as required
under the exception. Furthermore, the control exception only applies
where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customers. The
court held that the States' regulation of utility rates does not give the
States or its citizens ownership or control of the utilities. Consequently,
the requirements of this exception were not met. The judgment of the
district court was, therefore, affirmed.
Kaw Valley Electric Cooperative Co. v. Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.,
872 F.2d 931
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Kaw Valley, alleged that defendants, Kansas Electric Power
Cooperative ("KEPCO") and Kansas Electric Cooperatives ("KEC"),
had conspired to violate federal and Kansas antitrust laws. Because the
four-year statute of limitations for federal antitrust actions had run, the
district court granted summary judgment for KEPCO and KEC.
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
an antitrust cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff's business. Kaw Valley's first injury occurred when KEPCO adopted a policy
against providing power to nonmembers. Kaw Valley alleged subsequent injury because of a continuing conspiracy by KEPCO and KEC to
violate antitrust laws. If a continuing conspiracy exists, the statute of
limitations is restarted with each new independent and injurious act.
Whether a continuing refusal to deal is one cause of action, accruing
with the initial refusal, or separate causes of action, accruing with each
instance of refusal, depends on whether the initial refusal is final. If the
initial refusal is final, subsequent refusals do not restart the statute of
limitations. The court found that KEPCO's initial decision was final because its form and language clearly indicated its finality, even though
KEPCO subsequently offered service to Kaw Valley. Offers to compro-
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mise, within the context of litigation, do not destroy the initial finality
sufficiently to restart the statute of limitations.
Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetery Association, 891 F.2d 1473
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiffs, a trade association of independent grave marker builders
and dealers ("Monument Builders"), brought an antitrust action against
numerous cemeteries, cemetery associations, and a bronze monument
manufacturer. Monument Builders contended that defendants conducted anti-competitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2. The district court dismissed Monument Builders' claims
for lack of venue and failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Monument Builders subsequently appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that venue was proper in Kansas, finding that the claim could rationally be said to have arisen in Kansas as
well as Missouri. The court noted that special venue statutes, such as
section 12 of the Clayton Act, are supplemented by the general venue
provisions applicable to all civil cases. Second, the court reversed the
district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court could not
say beyond doubt that Monument Builders could prove no set of facts
supporting a claim that defendants engaged in a per se illegal tying arrangement. The court stated further that the complaint did state a claim
for conspiracy to monopolize.
Smith Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Smith Machinery ("Smith"), brought this antitrust action
against defendant, Hesston Corporation ("Hesston"). Smith, a farm
equipment dealer, claimed that Hesston's requirement that Smith carry
Hesston's tractors if it wanted to carry Hesston's other products was an
illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
The district court granted summary judgment in Hesston's favor, and
Smith appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the dismissal, held that Hesston's line
requirement was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act because it did
not foreclose choice to the consumer. Moreover, the court held that
what existed between Smith and Hesston was not a contract for sale of
the "tied" goods, but rather a general distributorship. A franchise
agreement, defining general terms and obligations of the relationship, is
not an executed contract for sale as required by section 3 of the Clayton
Act.

